I am a postdoctoral associate at the Tobin Center at Yale University. I received my Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University.
My research focuses on healthcare economics through the lens of industrial organizations with the particular interest in the information asymmetries and role of the public policy.
PhD in Economics, 2025
Northwestern University
MS in Economics, 2020
Northwestern University
BA in Economics, 2019
Lomonosov Moscow state University
This paper examines how over-the-counter drug labels influence consumer perceptions of efficacy, distort decision-making, and shape equilibrium outcomes under counterfactual regulatory scenarios. It addresses a key identification challenge—the unobservability of perceived efficacy under different information structures—by conducting a randomized controlled trial and integrating its findings into a structural model. Using data from a control group and three treatment arms, I construct product-level measures of perceived efficacy beliefs based on pairwise product comparisons. Leveraging control group data supplemented with NielsenIQ data, I estimate a structural demand model that isolates the role of efficacy beliefs while accounting for heterogeneous preferences. I then incorporate updated beliefs to assess equilibrium effects under each information treatment. In equilibrium, the most effective intervention—emphasizing equivalent efficacy—increases substitution between biologically equivalent products by 26%, reduces consumer spending by 12%, but also introduces second-degree price discrimination driven by symptom-label preferences.
No one can remain neutral regarding health information about their conditions. While some focus on the worst-case scenario, others seek justifications for not visiting the doctor. The complexity and diversity of current online health information (OHI) cater to both groups. This paper explains this behavior through the modification of the information acquisition model and further examines its relationship with healthcare utilization. It introduces a rational inattention model with a modified cost function that accounts for individual heterogeneity in perceiving the absence of illness. The model demonstrates that information acquisition costs are influenced by individuals’ concerns about overlooking signs of illness, causing information sources to act as thought accelerators rather than purely educational material. Empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework. First, the data shows that OHI usage generally leads to higher healthcare utilization. Second, OHI users who are concerned about missing illness signs use healthcare services more than those less worried. Third, the statistically insignificant difference in how OHI affects healthcare usage between groups that might benefit from increased concern and those that do not suggests that patients’ overconfidence, rather than knowledgeable worry, drives higher healthcare use. These findings raise critical policy questions about managing OHI-induced overconfidence and offer recommendations for enhancing physician–patient interactions in the context of OHI. (New update coming soon)
This study examines whether Medicare reimbursement schemes play a critical role in addressing market failures, particularly the slow adoption of innovative and consumer-beneficial technologies. It paper examines the role of Medicare financial incentives, market dynamics, and altruism in the hospital-level decision in adoption of new medical technologies along with their intertwine with the Medicare reimbursement policy. Using Medicare claims data, we study the case of Transcatheter Aortic Valve Replacement (TAVR)—a high-benefit but initially unprofitable procedure—around a 2015 reimbursement reform. While traditional strategic motives such as entry deterrence, patient steering, and learning-by-doing contribute to adoption decisions, we find that expectations of future reimbursement increases also play a critical role. These results suggest that, under certain conditions, delaying financial incentives may be an effective strategy to encourage early uptake of valuable innovations. (draft coming soon)