Anastasiia Evdokimova

Northwestern Economics

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Fields	Research: Industrial Organizations; Health Economics				
	Teaching: Industrial Organizations; Health Economics; Applied Microeconomics				
Education	Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2025 (Anticipated)				
	Dissertation: Information Asymmetry in the Healthcare markets				
	Committee: David Dranove (Chair), Gastón Illanes, Molly Schnell				
	BS.c., Economics; Cum Laude, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2019				
Fellowships &	Dissertation University Followship, Northwestern University 2024 2025				
Awards	Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University, 2024-2025 University Fellowship, Northwestern University, 2019-2024				
	University Fenowship, Northwestern University, 2019-2024				
Grants	Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (Northwestern)				
Teaching Experience	NU 349 Industrial Economics, NU 309 Public Finance, NU 339 Labor Economics, NU 310 Microeconomics, NU 342 Economics of Gender				
Research Experience	Research Assistant, David Dranove, Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, 2021/23				
Research Experience	Research Assistant, Amanda Starc, Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, 2021				
	Research Assistant, Dmitry Arhangelsky, CEMFI, 2018-2019				
Conferences	2024 European Winter Meet	ing			
	2023 The 12th Annual Conference of the ASHEcon (presenter)				
	2022 The 11th Annual Conference of the ASHEcon (poster session)				
	2022 NBER tutorial on the Economics of Digitization for economics graduate students				
	2021 Mentoring Workshop for Women & Non-Binary PhD Students in Health Economics & Health Policy				
	with support from AEA-CSV				
Job Market Paper	to investigate how misco the-counter market and is that beliefs about effo	urvey data, a randomi onceptions about drug how clearer informatic icacy are unobservable	zed controlled trial efficacy influence on can improve con e, which complicate	gn" I (RCT), and structural analysis consumer decisions in the over- usumer welfare. A key challenge es the assessment of consumers' this, I gathered pairwise product	
	comparisons from a con efficacy beliefs. The fir the same active compon- brochure outlining both	ttrol group and three the est two treatments modern ents or offer equivalent aspects before making	reatment arms to du lify product labels t efficacy, while the purchase decisions	evelop product-level measures of to indicate whether drugs share third provides consumers with a to document consumer choice al demand model that separately	

identifies the weight consumers place on beliefs about efficacy, while accounting for heterogeneous preferences. I then incorporate the revised beliefs to document demand responses to the information treatments. The results show that all treatments reduce information distortions and enhance welfare by increasing substitution between biologically equivalent and differently composed drugs. The most effective treatment, emphasizing equivalent efficacy, increases substitution elasticity by 22%, saves the average consumer \$1.09 (\$6.5 million annually across the 50 largest markets), and generates a welfare gain of \$1.20 per consumer. However, this approach also leads to second-degree price discrimination based on the symptom label preferences, highlighting the need for careful policy.

Other papers

"Does the Internet Improve Health Behavior? Costly Information Acquisition Under Heterogeneity in Risk Perception"

Health information cannot be neutral. Some individuals focus on worst-case scenarios, while others seek excuses to avoid doctors. The diverse online health information (OHI) caters to both. This paper modifies the information acquisition model to explain this behavior and its impact on healthcare utilization. It introduces a rational inattention model showing that concerns about missing illness signs drive up information acquisition costs, making information sources act as thought accelerators. Empirical analysis confirms that OHI generally increases healthcare use, especially among those worried about missing illness signs. The minimal difference in healthcare use between groups suggests overconfidence, rather than informed concern, drives higher utilization. These results highlight the need to manage OHI-induced overconfidence and improve physician-patient interactions.

"Innovation Acquisition and Conflict of Interest in the VI Healthcare Systems", with Zakaria El Amrani El Idriss

This study investigates market failures resulting from physician-hospital integration, specifically the suboptimal use of costly new technologies due to financial conflicts of interest. According to classic theory, vertically integrated systems (hospital + physician practices) can gain competitive advantages through management or technology, fostering innovation. However, common management policies may create conflicts of interest, reducing the use of innovative, expensive procedures. We focus on Medicareâs reimbursement system, hypothesizing that unequal policies lead to hospitals becoming dominant decision-makers due to their negotiating power. Using the case of Transcatheter Aortic Valve Replacement (TAVR), where Medicare initially reimbursed hospitals later than physicians, we test this hypothesis both theoretically and empirically.

"Promotional Activity as Tool of Information Distortion"

Pricing schemes under consumer inattention. It investigates why companies use joint promotions under a Low-High price scheme to influence consumer perceptions of the products and examines how changes in the information structure affect this strategy.

Languages English (fluent), Russian (native), Italian (intermediary)

References

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Professor Molly Schnell Department of Economics Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston, IL 60208 847.491.8235 schnell@northwestern.edu Professor Gastón Illanes Department of Economics Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston, IL 60208 847.491.8227 gaston.illanes@northwestern.edu